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Abstract: This paper seeks to examine some of the 
perceptions and attitudes developed by Muslims in relation 
to the social conflict of Maluku. This paper argues that 
there were no single views among Muslims with regard to 
the conflict. Some Muslim hard-liners in general have 
demonstrated hostile perceptions and confrontational 
attitudes toward their perceived enemy. They constructed 
the conflict as a “religious war,” and demanded that the 
Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (MUI) issue a 
fatwa> that would allow Muslims outside Maluku to fight 
against the enemy in Maluku. The Muslim moderates, on 
the other hand, tended to avoid religious vocabularies, 
while attempting to work out peaceful solutions. The semi-
official MUI, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Muhammadiyyah 
perceived the conflict as not religiously driven; they viewed 
the conflict in a more sophisticated way. They saw no need 
to wage a religious war and no need to issue a fatwa > for a 
national jiha>d. 
Keywords: Conflict, Maluku, confrontation, reconciliation, 
pela gandong. 
Introduction 
There is little doubt that the sectarian violence which erupted in 
Maluku from early 1999 until early 2002 that claimed more than 6,000 
lives and displaced some 70,000 others has its historical, political, 
economic, and religious origins and implications. During the conflict 
and peace process, speculations, reactions, and perceptions have 
become parts of the story: some tended to exacerbate the situation, 
while others wanted to improve it. Muslims, in their diversity, have 
become part of the players as well as spectators of the conflict. In 
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order to get a wider picture, it is important to comprehend how 
“radical” and “moderate” Muslims perceived the conflict and why they 
perceived the way they did. This comprehension is important because 
conflict can be well understood from a dynamic of interconnectedness 
between three dimensions: 1) context or situation of conflict, 2) 
perceptions of parties involved directly or indirectly in conflict, and 3) 
behavior of parties involved during conflict.1 
Some observers have tended to underestimate the role of religion 
in Maluku conflict.2 There is some agreement that religion serves 
simply as a complimentary factor in the conflict, emphasizing political, 
military, and economic factors. For example, Tri Ratnawati concluded 
that the clashes in Maluku are not a religious war.3 Azyumardi Azra 
equally maintained that religion indeed plays a certain role in this 
communal conflict, but this role comes only later.4 Gerry van Klinken 
also contended that the conflict lies not so much in inter-religious 
area.5 Likewise, the International Crisis Group (ICG) viewed religion 
as a minor factor. They stated in a report: “Though often described in 
terms of a Christian-Muslim fight, at the core of the Maluku violence 
lies economic and political competition between local interests. 
Wrapped around this core is a series of external problems ranging 
                                                 
1 Christoper R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (London: 1981), as cited by 
Lambang Trijono, “Peran Komunikasi dalam Konflik dan Untuk Perdamaian,” in 
Lukas S. Ispandriarno et al. (eds), Media-Militer-Politik: Crisis Communication: Perspektif 
Indonesia dan Internasional (Yogyakarta: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & Galang Press, 2002), 
p. 128.  
2 The reason why observers tend to underestimate religious factors in the conflict is 
perhaps that religion has been regarded simply as an expression of other things; 
Religion comes down to as a social, cultural, and psychological phenomenon. See 
Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Marocco and Indonesia (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. xii. 
3 Tri Ratnawati, “In Search of Harmony in Moluccas: A Political History Approach,” 
Chaidar S. Bamualim et al. (eds), Communal Conflicts in Contemporary Indonesia (Jakarta: 
Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya IAIN Jakarta & The Konrad Adenauer Foundation/KAF, 
2002), p. 14.  
4 Azyumardi Azra, “Pengantar,” in Merajut Damai di Maluku: Telaah Konflik Antarumat 
1999-2000 (Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia & Yayasan Pustaka Umat, 2000), pp. x-
xix; also Azyumardi Azra, “Communal Riots in Indonesia: The Decline of Indonesian 
Nationalism and the Rise of Separatism,” in Bamualim et al. (eds), Communal Conflicts in 
Contemporary Indonesia, p. 88.  
5 Gerry van Klinken, “What Caused the Ambon Violence?,” Inside Indonesia, No. 60 
(October-December 1999).  
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from the national agenda of a resurgent group of Muslim politicians to 
efforts by some segments of the military to undermine the (former) 
government of Abdurrahman Wahid.”6  
The above suggestions, however, should not overlook the fact that 
both parties involved either directly or indirectly in the Maluku conflict 
have perceived each other in religious terms. It can be accordingly 
argued that there is some truth in the theory of “race between Islam 
and Christianity” at least in their discourses. This paper attempts to 
reconstruct the history of the diversity of Muslim perceptions of the 
conflict that lasted from 1999 to 2002.     
In Southeast Asia, Muslims and Christians have been in quarrel 
since their first contact in sixteenth century.7 In light of this, recent 
conflict in Maluku can be better placed in the context of a long history 
of Muslim-Christian rivalry in the region. As can be seen below, it was 
the religious divide that played an important role in the durability and 
degree of conflict. If religion had not served as a crucial factor, the 
nature and scope of the conflict in Maluku would have been very 
different from what was happening.  
In general, there are two main perceptions and attitudes of 
Muslims in relation to the conflict in Maluku: confrontation and 
reconciliation. Hard-line individuals and organizations have tended to 
be confrontational, whereas the moderates have been more concerned 
with peaceful solutions.  
Voices of Confrontation 
Some common issues can be found in the radicals’ perceptions of 
the conflict in Maluku: Christianization, separatism, and colonialism 
which were seen as historically interconnected in Maluku. They also 
often used strong religious vocabularies during the conflict. In 
addition, Muslim radicals regarded the traditional institution of pela 
gandong as an ineffective practice and would not see its future in 
Maluku because it is un-Islamic and is used by Christians to loosen and 
even break Islamic ties between Muslims.   
                                                 
6 ICG in Peter Searle, “Ethnic-Religious Conflicts: Rise or Decline? Recent 
Developments in Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 1 (April 
2002), p. 4.  
7 See Leonard Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1993), p. 123; Anthony Reid, “A Religious Revolution,” Southeast Asia in the Age of 
Commerce 1450-1680, vol. II, pp. 132-201. 
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Just after the first outbreak on early January 1999, Muslim 
Ambonese activists were quick to be very convinced that the riot was 
masterminded by Christian groups. Rivalry between gangs who 
happened to be different in religion was just triggering factor. They 
believed that the so-called Reds (Christians) came first and, they 
claimed, Muslims had to use another color distinguishing them from 
Christians in the battle (White). From here on, conflicts escalated in 
different places in Maluku in which Islam and Christianity became 
identity. Grouping was based on religion, not by brotherhood (pela) or 
sub-ethnic groups. 
The “conspiracy theory” began to be spread by hard-line Muslims. 
Rustam Kastor, an Ambonese retired Indonesian army officer, who 
was proud of having military background and claimed to represent 
‘Muslim side’, published a series of book arguing that South Moluccan 
Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS) and Christians were the 
political conspirators who had long planned to destroy and expel 
Muslims from Ambon, Maluku. His books soon become very popular 
among local Muslims and Muslims from outside Maluku. What made 
his books so appealing is that Rustam used a language shared by 
Muslims. Rustam insisted since the beginning that “this is a religious 
war.” For him, Christians always misused the facts, spread lies, and 
blamed Muslims for all the riots. Rustam intended to convince 
Muslims that it was the Muslims who have become the victims of the 
political conspiracy of Christians.8 
Rustam insists that the time of attack on the day when Muslims 
had religious celebration after the fasting month of Ramadhan was not 
spontaneous. In addition, the fact that the place from which the 
Christian attackers on the following day came was Central Church at 
Matanatha (Gereja Pusat Matanatha) indicates, Rustam believed, that 
Christians were the main actors. Moreover, Rustam observed, the 
primary targets of insults were all religious symbols related to Islam 
(Mosque, the Qur’a>n, Prophet Muh}ammad, kubah at the top of the 
mosque, religious schools (madrasah), religious offices such as the 
Office of Religious Affairs (KUA) and the Office of Department of 
Religion (Kandepag).9 To justify his belief, Rustam repeatedly quoted a 
                                                 
8 Rustam Kastor, Fakta, Data, dan Analisa Konspirasi RMS dan Kristen Menghancurkan 
Umat Islam di Ambon-Maluku (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2000), pp. 60-1. 
9 Ibid., p. 246. 
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Qur’anic verse: ”Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with 
thee unless thou follow their religions.(II.120).”  
Why did Christians attack Muslims? Christians hated Muslims, 
Rustam speculated, because they felt threatened by the rising Muslim 
power at the local and national level.10 Christians would not be able to 
establish a separated Christian state if Muslims still live in Maluku. And 
why did Muslims attack Christian as well? Rustam believed that 
Muslims felt being discriminated by colonials. Local Christians were 
better treated, while Muslims were left behind. Injustices were much 
more severely faced by Muslims than by Christians. Christians could 
become Dutch soldiers and get good education, whereas Muslims were 
poor and remained uneducated. Therefore, colonialism has been 
always negative in the minds of Muslims. 
The increasing number of local and migrant Muslims (from other 
islands, notably Buton, Bugis, Makassar, Java, and Sumatera) was 
perceived by local Christians as threatening the composition of their 
society. In Ambon alone, today statistically Protestants account for 51. 
92%, Catholics 5.55%, and Muslims 42.38%. Before Muslims 
accounted for less than 30%. Despite the increasing number, Rustam 
said, “Ambonese Muslims have no unifying organization, no united 
leadership, unlike Christians who have Moluccan Protestant Church 
(Gereja Protestan Maluku, GPM). The strength of Christians in terms of 
organization has made them easier to initiate a massive attack. For 
Rustam, the role of Islam in Ambon has been superior than that of 
Christianity in Ambonese history. Rustam referred to colonial history 
when, he believed, Muslims were the true patriots, struggling against 
European powers. Most Ambonese heroes, he believed, were Muslims, 
including Pattiwane, Kakiali, Gimelaka, Sultan Babullah and Sultan 
Nuku.11  
Regarding the tradition of pela gandong, Rustam does not believe in 
the effectiveness of pela (Moluccan cultural tie) because in practice the 
RMS and Christians have often broken the tie by prosecuting Muslims 
in the past and they did it again now. If pela was effective, Rustam 
claimed, Christians would not have killed their pela brothers. Pela was 
not supported by Muslims because it was against Islamic teachings. 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 122. 
11 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Rustam believed that there was a close connection between 
Church and RMS. For Rustam, RMS was simply  Dutch-created “toy 
state” (Negara Boneka). He changed the abbreviation RMS which 
originally meant Republik Maluku Selatan (South Moluccan Republic) 
into Republik Maluku Sarani (Christian Moluccan Republic). Rustam 
insisted that with its Chrstian character, RMS was and still is anti-
Islamic. Hence, Rustam identified RMS with Christianity and 
Christianity with RMS. Rustam tried to clarify what he meant by his 
statement that “not all Christians are RMS members, but all RMS 
members are Christians.”12, but he was not clear and seemed to remain 
convinced that RMS and Christianity were inextricably interwoven. 
When being attacked, Muslims show their defense as religious 
obligation (jiha>d fi > sabi >l Alla>h, war in the path of God). Some Qur’anic 
verses and Prophetic sayings were cited to justify his interpretation of 
jiha>d being “war against Christians”. Rustam welcomed the arrival of  
Laskar Jihad from Java. Rustam regarded this as revenge and help for 
Muslims in Maluku. Muslims’ attacks from May and July 2000 for 
example were just spontaneous reactions against the previous attacks 
by the enemy. Rustam regarded Laskar Jihad together with local 
Muslims as defenders of religion (hizbullah) and defenders of the 
integrity of Indonesian nation (hizbul wathan). Laskar Jihad was seen as 
Islamic Troops in Afghanistan battling against Soviets. “Allah the 
Greatest” was yelled in the streets. Laskar Jihad was welcomed by local 
Muslims; Thalib was regarded by them as ratu adil (millenarian 
leader).13 
Soon after the publication of Rustam’s books, Harian Suara 
Maluku, a local Christian newspaper in Maluku, refuted Rustam’s 
opinions and accusations. Suara Maluku responded that Rustam has 
become another provocateur which fuels further hatred among 
Muslims towards Christians. Instead of cooling down the situation, 
Rustam was regarded as making the conflict worst. According to Suara 
Maluku, Rustam is clearly anti-Christian, not only anti-RMS. For Suara 
Maluku, Rustam’s citations of Christian religion show his anti-Christian 
propaganda: “As for Christians, they are trinity people, astray, and 
cross slave. They got lost because they insulted Allah. Their faith is 
                                                 
12 Ibid., pp. 4-5.  
13 Rustam Kastor, Badai Pembalasan Laskar Mujahidin: Ambon dan Maluku: Mei-Juli 2000 
(Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2000), pp. 86-7.  
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three in one, Maria is His wife and Christ is His son and believed that 
God has come down from His throne and then resided in a women’s 
womb.” Suara Maluku goes on to say that Rustam has insulted 
Christianity as religion and has provoked Muslims to fight against 
Christians in Maluku by citing Qur’anic verses allowing war. Rustam 
was seen by Suara Maluku as having aggravated the victims on Muslim 
side, while not mentioning Christian victims and casualties at all. Suara 
Maluku demanded Rustam be brought to police and court for all these 
insults.14 
Rustam’s articles were published during the conflicts, which were 
then refuted by Suara Maluku and other newspapers. Rustam answered 
back the refutations from Suara Maluku, still being convinced by his 
own speculations. Rustam was very proud of having a military 
background and claims to represent a Muslim voice in Maluku. 
Rustam’s books attracted wide audience, especially amongst hard-liners 
in Maluku but perhaps more significantly outside Maluku.  
Rustam Kastor was appointed to be a committee member on 
Ambon case by Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia, MUI) of Maluku but was then replaced by Thamrin 
Ely, another  Ambonese because, according to Thamrin, Rustam had a 
“personal motive”. The former President Abdurrahman Wahid 
considered Rustam to be one of the provocateurs in Maluku, but 
Wahid did not bring him into trial.15 
Thamrin Ely, an Ambonese Muslim activist, the secretary of MUI 
of Maluku branch, and the president of National Mandate Party (Partai 
Amanat Nasional, PAN) of Maluku branch, believed in similar scenario 
that Christians planned the attack on January 19, 1999. One of the 
indicatios was that the “Reds” emerged before the “Whites”. Thamrin 
Ely denied the accusation from Christians that Muslims had prepared 
the war before that day by building action units (satuan tugas). Like 
Rustam Kastor, Thamrin Ely was convinced that elements of the RMS 
and Christians were behind the attack.16 
                                                 
14 Rustam Kastor, Suara Maluku Membantah, Rustam Kastor Menjawab (Yogyakarta: 
Wihdah Press, 2000), pp. 23-65. 
15 Ahmad Suaedy et al. (eds), Luka Maluku Milter Terlibat (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus 
Informasi, 2000), pp. 23-9. 
16 Ibid.  
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Thamrin admitted that both polarization of religion and “national 
political scenario” were the main factors behind the conflict. Yet, 
Thamrin disagreed with the marginalization theory which holds that 
Christians became increasingly marginalized in local economy and 
politics. In fact, Thamrin argued, there were still more Christians in the 
government officials. Therefore, it is not true to point economic gap as 
an important factor. There is something more religious. Thamrin 
believed that religious polarization is a colonial legacy. “Christian 
Ambonese peoples were treated very well by European colonials: good 
education, Malay language learning, and most became colonial 
bureaucrats albeit at lower level. Only Christians were allowed to 
become Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) soldiers, whereas 
most Muslim immigrants came to Ambon for trade and 
entrepreneurship. As new Muslim pilgrims became increased, Middle 
Eastern traders came to Ambon as well. Colonialism and Christianity 
were so close that as nationalism came, Ambonese Muslims regarded it 
as a hope, whereas Christians viewed it as a threat.17  
Another Ambonese Muslim activist who believed in Christia-
nization project behind the riots is Umar Tuasikal, who lived in Java 
and was active at Association for Moluccan Muslim Families 
(Himpunan Keluarga Muslim Maluku, HIKMMA). In his book published 
on January 2000, Umar insisted that the root cause of the conflict has 
been religious antagonism, a continuation of Perang Salib (the medieval 
Crusades). Umar considered the Christian attacks in early 1999 as part 
of a grand ‘mission sacrée’. He quoted the term “La Conquete du Monde 
Musulman” to refer this phenomenon. Umar believed, Christian 
imperialists came to Maluku for spices and for converting Maluku 
people into Christianity. In this book, Christians were perceived as 
‘aggressors’ and therefore Muslims had the obligation to defend their 
home, life, and religion (jiha>d). Umar cited Qur’anic verses to justify 
this belief in jiha>d. “Fighting is prescribed upon you and ye dislike it. 
But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that 
ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth and ye know 
not.” (II: 216) For Umar, RMS is in fact Republik Maluku Serani 
(Nasrani, Christians).  
                                                 
17 Mansur Alkatiri, “Politik dan Kecemburuan Berbungkus Agama,” Ummat, No. 35, 
(March 15, 1999), pp. 23-4.  
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Umar believed that the bloody Idul Fitri conflict has been long 
planned by Christian RMS. Umar was convinced that through radios, 
Christian groups had already consolidated their people from Moluccan 
Protestant Church (Gereja Protestan Maluku, GPM). Umar writes, “In a 
meeting in a church in Lateri village in the eastern part of Ambon 
Christians decided the time for massive attack against Muslims. There 
was no agreement between old and young people at the meeting. The 
young wanted the attack to be held at the first takbi >r at the time of Idul 
Fitri prayer, whereas the old wanted it soon after the prayer when 
Muslims were neglectful.” Umar accused that the plan was not only 
known by Christians in Ambon, but also in the Netherlands and other 
regions in Indonesia.18 Umar believed that Christians had attempted to 
shift the real cause from religious antagonism to economic, political, 
and social gap. Muslims, he believed, have been victimized by a wider 
Christian conspiracy. Umar justified his belief by referring to Samuel 
Huntington’s theory of clash of civilizations. For him, Eastern 
Indonesia is being planned to become “Eastern Christendom”. 
After ten months of conflict, M. Husni Putuhena, another 
Ambonese activist, published a book entitled ‘Buku Putih Tragedi 
Kemanusiaan dalam Kerusuhan di Maluku” (A True Story: Human Tragedy 
in Maluku Riots). Putuhena concluded that Idul Fitri violence was 
engineered by both Church in Maluku and RMS in the Netherlands 
and was supported by Christian organizations in Maluku. The timing 
of the attack (Idul Fitri, Muslim celebration after Ramadhan fasting) 
was chosen purposefully, indicating that their intention was religious. 
Regarding the role of RMS, the date (January 19) was one day after the 
anniversary of RMS (January 18th 1950). Putuhena believed that the 
attack was aimed to reduce the number of Muslims in Maluku, either 
through slaughtering or forced exodus to allow Christians to separate 
from Indonesia. The burnings of mosques and Muslim houses were 
believed to be a revenge of Maluku Christians for the previous 
burnings of Church outside Maluku, especially during Ketapang riot on 
November 22, 1998. The attack was also believed to have a global aim 
of Protestant Oikumene (one place, one Church, one God). Putuhena 
believed that Christian leaders used two means: violence and peace, 
but they provoked peoples with lies and facts manipulation. The attack 
                                                 
18 Umar Tuasikal, Quo Vadis Modus Vivendi Antar Umat Beragama di Ambon (Jakarta: 
Himpunan Keluarga Muslimin Maluku, 2000), p. 57. 
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also shows, Putuhena argued, jealousy, revenge, and hatred on the 
Christian side toward Muslims.19 
While the above activists are local, hard-line groups such as Laskar 
Jihad came when the conflict had occurred for more than one year 
(April 2000). The arrival of Laskar Jihad does not suggest that local 
Muslims were not perceiving the battle as religious. Before their arrival, 
religious polarization had existed. The arrival simply exacerbated the 
existing polarization and made much more violence. Laskar Jihad 
(literary meaning “holy war troops”), was a paramilitary division under 
the Communication Forum for the Followers and the Community of 
the Prophet (Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, FKAWJ). The 
chief, Ja’far Umar Thalib was a charismatic Wahhabis cleric, who went 
to Afghanistan from 1987 to 1989, driven by his sense of Islamic 
solidarity. Originally, the founding of FKAWJ can be seen as a search 
for authenticity, but it turned out to be anti-Christianism, anti-
semitism, and anti-Americanism. But Laskar Jihad represents a later 
phase of revivalism, namely “neo-fundamentalism”. FKAWJ had 
different social activities but Laskar Jihad was specifically aimed to be a 
militia paramilitary group.20 
Thalib appeared to be both religiously and politically radical. He 
often criticized the government especially regarding what he believed 
as insulting Islamic interests. Although Ja’far once denied himself as 
being radical, saying: “I am not radical. I tend to be rational in seeing 
all problems; political principles that I take can be discussed rationally 
and responsibly,” Ja’far cannot deny the facts that his activities were 
largely radical religiously and politically. Ja’far declared “Jihad 
resolution” (fatwa> or religious edict on jiha>d) in April 2000. FKAWJ 
based this fatwa> on the fatwa>s of Jihad in Maluku issued by Middle 
Eastern Salafy mufti >s, including ‘Abd al-Muh}sin al-`Abba>d from 
Medina, Muqbil b. Ha >di > al-Wa>d }i’i> from Yemen, Ra>bi > b. Ha>di > al-
Madkhali > from Saudi Arabia, S {a >lih} al-Suhaymi> and Muh}ammad b. Ha>di > 
al-Madkhali> from Medina. On the basis of these fatwa>s,  declared the 
“Moluccan War”, defending Islam from Christian attacks. Quoting a 
medieval scholar Ibn Taymi >yah, Thalib said, “Should our enemy attack 
                                                 
19 M. Husni Putuhena, Buku Putih Tragedi Kemanusiaan dalam Kerusuhan di Maluku. 
(Maluku: Lembaga Eksistensi Muslim Maluku, 1999), pp. 52-55.  
20 See Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of 
Transition in Indonesa,” Indonesia, 73 (April 2002), pp. 145-69.  
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Muslims, to confront the attack would be an obligation incumbent on 
the Muslims who are being attacked and it would be also compulsory 
for other Muslims to help them.”21 
Ja’far knew that his decision was controversial but he did not care 
about other opinions and the government’s interdiction because, he 
believed, quick action was necessary or Muslims in Maluku would be 
destroyed by the Christian RMS. Ja’far observed that there was 
manipulation of ‘conflict mapping’ about what was happening around 
Maluku conflict, but he was not clear what he meant by this. Yet, Ja’far 
claimed, “what is happening in Maluku is not a conflict between Islam 
and Christianity, but between RMS or neo-RMS rebels and Indonesian 
nationalists. Therefore, all loyal Muslim nationalists should fight 
against the rebels.”22 Here it becomes obvious that the reason why he 
used the vocabulary of jiha>d was to attract wider audience of Muslims: 
not only Ambonese, but also and mostly, Javanese and other Muslim 
Indonesians. Ja’far succeeded in trying to appeal to a wider community 
by emphasizing that the issue at stake in Maluku was about Christian 
separatism versus Muslims nationalists, while using strong religious 
vocabularies (fatwa> and jiha>d).     
When the situation in Maluku after about two years became 
increasingly under control since the government carried out 
reconciliation programs, Thalib disbanded Laskar Jihad and FKAWJ 
after a meeting of the Executive Board in October 2002. The 
disbanding was taken because the original mission had become 
deviated with “too political” activities. The original missions were, 
Thalib himself explained, to carry out religious duty to help Muslim 
brothers in conflict area when the government was incapable. When 
the government controlled the situation, Laskar Jihad saw no need to 
continue its activities.23 
It seemed that Laskar Jihad’ s withdrawal from Ambon and 
Maluku received positive response from different elements, but some 
local Muslims admitted that they still needed Laskar Jihad. Some 
argued that it was time for the national government to deal with RMS 
which was widely believed among Muslims as the main cause of the 
conflict in Maluku. It was said that fatwa>s from Arab Saudi influenced 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 166. 
22 Tempo, March 2002. 
23 Tempo, February 10, 2003. 
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the decision to withdraw. This indicates, as a Muslim historian 
Azyumardi Azra argues, that there was a direct network between 
Indonesia and the Middle East. Others, like Amidhan, the chief of 
MUI, contended that the withdrawal signified that people had begun 
to trust their government in solving the conflict.24 However, some 
Muslim elements praised the various efforts of Laskar Jihad in Maluku. 
An Islamic newspaper, Republika, appreciated the presence of Laskar 
Jihad in Maluku for they had benefited Muslims in Maluku. Laskar 
Jihad proved to have assisted and protected local Muslims from being 
defeated by the enemy; they were also praised of having all the courage 
to defend Indonesia from RMS separatism wishing for national 
disintegration. Even the governor of Maluku, Saleh Latuconsina, was 
reported to have been surprised by the withdrawal of Laskar Jihad. 
Saleh admitted that now with the absence of Laskar Jihad, social 
service (religious preaching, free medical aid, and education) that was 
initiated and carried out by Laskar Jihad during their arrival in Maluku 
now stopped operating. Saleh observed that many local Muslims in 
Maluku complained the withdrawal because they still needed Laskar 
Jihad. 
Another hard-liner involved in the conflict is Front to the 
Defenders of Islam (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) of Maluku. The front 
issued a statement called “Intensive Analysis: Data and Facts on 
Maluku Conflict”, in which there are some indications about the role 
of RMS and Christianity in Maluku conflict. FPI claimed that the 
attack was planned by Church, referring to a thesis by DS A.N. 
Radjawane, entitled “Islam in Ambon and Haruku”, which indicates 
that Christianization project has long been planned: “Nowadays a 
concrete plan in the evangelist strategy on Muslims has not been 
possessed by Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM), but we should be 
grateful that Church has began to open their eyes towards the efforts 
of Christianization in Maluku.” 25 
Another hard-line organization which has the main base in Jakarta 
is Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity (Komite Indonesia 
untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, KISDI). KISDI has been famous for their 
vocal voice for “Islamic causes”. HA Sumargono, the secretary general, 
believed that Maluku conflict has turned out to be a religious war, not 
                                                 
24 Republika, October 17, 2002.  
25 Ibid., p. 67.  
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simply ordinary bloody riots. KISDI demanded the government and 
security apparatus to be sincere and fair in solving the Ambon case and 
not to hide the real problem, which is Christianization-separatism. 
KISDI believed that Ambon has become the field of jiha>d. This 
decision was taken without prior fatwa>  issued by Islamic organizations 
such as MUI. “The situation in Ambon”, Sumargono observed, “is 
very worrying and this could harm the future of Maluku as part of the 
unitary state of Indonesia.” He said that Muslim victims in Ambon are 
shahi>d, just like those who die in fight in the name of God. Muslims’ 
condition was believed to become worst as they were continuously 
attacked and expelled from their home and village. The attacks against 
Muslims must be ended, Sumargono demanded. In the meantime, 
Sumargono asked, “Don’t take weapons from Muslims right away 
because they still need them for their defense against others’ attacks. 
Christian leaders must be more active in ending the violent acts 
conducted by their followers.”26   
The role of those hard-liners seem to suggest that a deadly ethnic 
riot like in Maluku has proved to serve as the proving ground of 
extremist organizations, which sometimes provides leadership. The riot 
may test mettle, cement esprit de corps, and aid their recruitment 
efforts. Laskar Jihad and FPI were born out of the violence and 
contributed to a considerable share to later violent episodes. Violence 
may thus give enduring organizational expression to the polarization of 
sentiment. 27 
Activists from outside Maluku have been also involved in justifying 
the conflict in Maluku. An Islamic politician who was also a member 
of Indonesian parliament (DPR), Abdul Qadir Djaelani equally 
believed in religious conspiracy theory. Djaelani placed Maluku conflict 
in the context of global and national anti-Islamism. It was designed by 
a global Christian force which had long intended to separate Maluku 
from Indonesia. Djaelani pointed to several examples which show how 
Christian leaders and commoners were anti-Islamic. He mentioned 
peoples like a Jesuit General Leonardo Benny Murdani, a Protestant 
Major General Theo Safei, and F. Litaay. Djaelani regarded Maluku 
conflict in early 1999 as a continuation of previous Christian attacks on 
                                                 
26 Kompas, July 30, 1999. 
27 Donald L. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: 
University of California Press, 2001), p. 12. 
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Muslims. Gereja Protestan Maluku and RMS had a together plan to 
attack Muslims. President of RMS in the Netherlands, F.J.L. 
Tutuhatunewa, was reported to have sent “war fund” to Ambon.28 An 
indication of the involvement of RMS is the Declaration of Front for 
Moluccan Sovereignty (Front Kedaulatan Maluku, FKM) on December 
18th 2000 in Ambon which stated that the Indonesian government is 
an imperialist; TNI (Indonesian army) and Polri (Indonesia Police) are 
“occupying soldiers”. 29 In addition, Djaelani believed, pela gandong is 
contradictory to Islam because it creates secular relationships and 
unknown in Islamic teachings. 
Another activist, Al-Chaidar, who is Acehnese, organized The 
Great Preaching/Meeting (Tablig Akbar) attended by some 100, 000 
people at National Monument Jakarta on January 7th, 2000. The Great 
Meeting declared jiha >d to Ambon. In one of his articles, Al-Chaidar 
believed that Maluku is and should always be Islamic. He asked people: 
“Where does the name Maluku come from? He responded: “It comes 
from an Arabic term “Maliku or Muluk” which means “the land of 
lords” and is applied originally to a chain of five islands, to spice 
islands”. It was only when Portuguese and Dutch colonized Maluku 
respectively that Maluku peoples became Christianized. Hence, 
Christianization and Colonialism for Al-Chaidar were identical. Al-
Chaidar called Maluku conflict as “the Butchering of Muslims as an 
expression of fear on the side of Ambonese Christians.” Al-Chaidar 
relied on Robert Chauvel’s thesis on the threat of RMS against 
Indonesian nation-state and Muslim-Christian race since colonial 
times. Al-Chaidar for example cited Chauvel’s statement that “the 
Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of South Moluccas, RMS) and its 
suppression was (sic) a tragedy for Ambonese society. It was the worst 
possible way in which Ambon could have part of independent of 
Indonesia.”30 It follows from this that, Al-Chaidar believes, the 
Christian RMS played a role in the recent conflict in Maluku.  
As has been often suggested, mass media played an important role 
in seeking and spreading reports and opinions. A number of hard-line 
                                                 
28 Tempo, December 20-26, 1999. 
29 Abdul Qadir Djaelani, Agama dan Separatisme menjadi Landasan Konflik Maluku dan Poso 
(Jakarta: Yayasan Pengkajian Islam Madinah Al-Munawwarah, 2001), p. 8.   
30 Richard Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers, and Separatists: The Ambonese Islands From 
Colonialism to Revolt 1880-1950  (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990), p. 393.   
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Islamic magazines included Media Dakwah (Islamic preaching 
magazine) and Sabili (meaning My Path), with the latter claiming more 
than seventy thousands exemplars. In general, these media believed 
only their own version of events. Media Dakwah (MD), an Islamic 
magazine with wide circulation among Muslim activists, also depicted 
the conflict in Maluku as religious and Maluku as the field of Jihad for 
Muslims. MD equated Maluku war with the medieval Crusades. They 
cited how Christians used religious symbols when attacking Muslims: 
Long Live Jesus, Islam Coward, Bravo Israel! MD was mostly 
concerned with the victims from Muslim side. MD accused 
Association for Indonesian Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Indonesia, 
PGI) for manipulating the fact that Muslims became the main victims. 
Although PGI officially refuted the description of Maluku violence as 
‘ethnic cleansing’, ‘religious cleansing’ and the like, MD still believed in 
these. MD praised itself and other media (such as Sabili, Aspirasi, 
Abadi, and Saksi) that attempted to report Muslim side when other 
media (mostly Christians) did not give enough attention to Muslim 
victims. MD complimented their reports with an interview with 
Abdullah Hemamahua, ex-President of Association of Islamic Students 
(Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) and Masyumi party leader, who 
viewed Maluku war as being religiously-driven.31     
Media reports on how more and more Muslims have been 
defeated or became victims continuously worried Muslim activists. 
Sabili ceaselessly reported that Maluku conflict brought about tragic 
stories felt by Muslims as insulting their religion. One of the stories 
came from an ima >m (an Islam leader) of Mosque Al-Huda in Ahuru, 
named H. Husen Toisuta, telling how on February 27th, 1999, 
Christians shot Muslims in the midst of their praying at the mosque. 
Another witness from Council for Indonesian Islamic Propagation 
(Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) reported that he saw how 
Ambonese Christians and local apparatus slaughtered Muslim peoples. 
These stories and the like reported by Islamic journals and verbal 
communicants have led ‘radical Muslims’ to hold demonstrations and 
to wage war against those whom they viewed as enemy. Religious 
sentiment was so deep that going to Ambon was regarded as the only 
alternative they had. 
                                                 
31 Media Dakwah, Ramadhan 1429/December 1999.  
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In this deeply psychological situation, it should not be surprising 
that street demonstrations took place in Java, Sumatera, Sulawesi, and 
other major cities as Muslims felt being increasingly victimized in 
Ambon, while the government was regarded impotent. Demonstra-
tions were held by many hard-line organizations, including Association 
for Action of Indonesian Muslim Students (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), Association for Intra-campus Muslim 
Students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus, HAMMAS), 
Indonesian Committee for World Islamic Solidarity (KISDI). Now 
they began to conceive of the conflict as religious war. They demanded 
that National MUI should issue a fatwa > to allow Muslims to go to 
Ambon as holy warriors (muja>hidi >n). An Islamic journal called Tabloid 
Aliansi Keadilan saw enough reasons driving the issuance of fatwa > 
instructing jiha>d in Maluku. First, the violence in Maluku was not an 
ordinary criminality; it was a planned religious violence against 
Muslims. Some churches such as Church at Hilo played a role in 
mobilizing Christians before attacking Muslims. Second, there was no 
real effective solution given by local and national government; the 
Indonesian army and police were not quick to prevent and reduce the 
increasing violence. In these uncertainties and dissatisfaction with 
Jakarta’s government on resolving the violence, with the perceived 
devastating situation in Maluku, Thalib with his Laskar Jihad took the 
opportunity by sending thousands of Islamic troops to Ambon, 
ignoring the prohibition by the government. Besides Laskar Jihad, a 
number of holy war posts began to recruit Muslim volunteers as 
warriors to be sent to Ambon. There were a number of established 
posts including those of Pemuda Bulan Bintang, a youth institution under 
Partai Bulan Bintang (Party of Moon-Star), Islamic Propagation Union 
(Majelis Ta’lim Radio Dakta Bekasi) Association for Action of 
Indonesian Muslim Students (KAMMI), Movement of Islamic Youth 
(Gerakan Pemuda Islam, GPI), and Front for Islamic Defenders (Front 
Pembela Islam, FPI). 32 
How did Christian groups and media respond to the above 
speculations and accusations? It seems that Christian media tried to 
provide their own version. Although it is not my intention here to 
examine Christian views on the conflict, it is worth noting to mention 
                                                 
32 "Bom Hidup Mujahidin Menunggu Komando," Abadi, no. 18 (March 17th, 1999), p. 
18. 
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one independent Christian-based organization to have some insight 
about the Christian side. Jubilee Campaign, an interdenominational 
Christian human rights organization which worked for persecuted 
Christians all over the world, in their report in December 1999 
criticized radical Islamic media, leaders, and organizations who 
depicted the conflict in Maluku as a field of jiha >d for Muslims against 
Christians. As for the background and the salient points of the conflict, 
Jubilee believed that the sectarian conflict was master-minded by 
Islamist Indonesian army (TNI) officers and Islamist organizations in 
Indonesia in an effort to change the constitution of Indonesia from a 
pluralist basis to the one that is flavored by Islamic Law and to 
Islamize the country as a whole.  
Jubilee Campaign also refuted the allegations put forward by 
Islamic radicals that RMS masterminded the conflict. Jubilee asserted, 
the Christians have strongly reputed this allegation and RMS leaders in 
Holland (both Christians and Muslims in the movement) have also 
strongly denied their involvement in Maluku conflict. Jubilee 
Campaign requested to the Foreign Office and the European Union to 
pressure the Indonesian Government to prosecute all parties who 
incited and carried out unjustified violence, including those who are 
calling for jiha>d and ensure accurate reporting by the media and that 
that they do not incite religious hatred.33 Hence, regarding Muslim and 
Christian version of events, suffice it to quote Gerry van Klinken: 
“From here on, events escalated as each side believed only its own 
version of events. Muslims spoke of halting the ‘Christianization’ drive. 
Christians spoke of Islamic ‘fanaticism’ in Jakarta, while some spoke 
nostalgically of the Christian-dominated South Maluku Republic 
breakaway movement of 1950.” 34      
Voices of Reconciliation 
Unlike the above mentioned individuals and organizations, MUI 
attempted to stand in all sides in response to the on-going conflict in 
Maluku.  K.H. Ali Yafie, the president of MUI, contended that Maluku 
conflict has been multi-dimensional: historical, cultural, social, political, 
and religious. Historically, European colonialism had a bad impact on 
                                                 
33 Jubilee Campaign United Kingdom, "Analysis of the Sectarian Conflict in Maluku 
and Its Role in the Islamisation of Indonesia,", A report issued in December 1999.   
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social relationship in Maluku: Muslim-Christian divide which could 
manifest itself in inter-religious violence. Consequently, Maluku 
societies have been filled with prejudices and distrust. Pela Gandong was 
not as effective as people have expected. In response to what was 
happening in Maluku since January 1999, the National MUI had 
attempted reconciliational approach. MUI invited all parties involved 
in conflict not to repeat Muslim-Christian conflict in medieval history 
(Crusades) as well as in Bosnia and Kosovo. Religious rivalry must be 
ended. MUI claimed that they had attempted since the outbreak of 
violence to find peaceful solutions. They hold meetings with religious 
leaders from Islam and Christianity. MUI asked Muslims to take 
peaceful measures and to avoid provocations. MUI established a team 
for fact finding (Tim Pencari Fakta) and coordinated humanitarian aids. 
MUI rejected the declaration of war by some radical elements, refused 
to issue a fatwa> to go to war in Maluku demanded by them. There 
would be no “National Jihad” in the sense that all Muslims in 
Indonesia fight against Christians in Maluku. The obligation of Jihad 
can only be applied to those peoples in Maluku in defense of their own 
place. Muslims outside Maluku can only aid Maluku in humanitarian 
terms.35 
The two biggest religious organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
with some 35 millions membership and Muhammadiyyah with 30 
millions followers, went in the same line. They did not perceive the 
conflict as the hard-liners did. Thus, for example, as KH Hasyim 
Muzadi, the president of NU, said, in Surabaya on April 8th 2000, NU 
does not support solidarity actions in the form of Jihad in Ambon. 
Jihad with violence and agitation would aggravate, rather than solve, 
Maluku conflict. Any kinds of agitation are not helpful in solving the 
conflict. NU will only support the role of inter-religious leaders who 
would come to Ambon to calm Ambonese peoples by dialogue and 
persuasive approach.36 NU leaders seem to believe that the series of 
conflict in Maluku were caused by complex factors that there was no 
need to bring it into a religious war. To believe that the conflict is a 
religious war would lead to a more hostile attitudes in both sides and 
the consequences would become worst and longer. Likewise, the 
                                                 
35 MUI, Merajut Damai di Maluku: Telaah Konflik Antar Umat 1999-2000 (Jakarta: MUI & 
Yayasan Pustaka Umat, 2000), pp. vii-ix. 
36 Kompas, April 10, 2000. 
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Muhammadiyyah leader, Muhammad Syafii Maarif, also in many 
occasions stressed the non-religious character of the conflict. 
The moderates’ views were not surprisingly supported by the 
government, especially in this case, the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
Despite their shortcomings in solving the conflict in the first and 
second year, the government attempted to stand in all sides. The then 
Minister of Religious Affairs, Malik Fadjar, asserted that Ambon 
conflict is not a religious war. He maintained that if Ambon conflict is 
brought into religious conflict, the solution would become more 
difficult and conflict area would be more spreading.37 
It is now also important to see some public opinion about the 
conflict. Public opinions seem to sustain the perceptions of the 
moderates and government officials. At least, as the following polling 
suggested, the majority of people in Jakarta viewed the conflict in 
Maluku as non-religious. Some 500 respondents living in Jakarta were 
asked a number of questions in late January, 1999 by Tempo, a Jakarta-
based weekly periodical.38 
How is inter-religious relation so far in Indonesia?  
No  Total Muslim Non-Muslim 
1 Very tense 2 % 1 % 4 % 
2 Tense  23 % 23 % 17 % 
3 Normal  41 % 43 % 39 % 
4 Tolerant  33 % 32 % 38 % 
5 Very good  1 % 1 % 2 % 
 Total % 100 % 100% 100% 
Is religion a source of conflict? 
Yes  23 % 
No 61 % 
Doubtful 16 % 
Is Maluku conflict religious? 
Yes  16 % 
No 68 % 
Doubtful 16 % 
 
What factors in religion can cause conflict? 
Religious People misinterpret religion 59 % 
Religious Solidarity 29 % 
                                                 
37 Kompas, March 4, 1999. 
38 “Perang Agama, Siapa Bilang?,” Tempo, 2-8 February 1999, pp. 192-3.  
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Religious Teachings 1 % 
No answer 11 % 
What are real causes of conflict? 
Groups Desiring Chaos 85 % 
Political Elite Conflict 47 % 
Socio-economic Jealousy/Gap 35 % 
Ethnic Difference 9 % 
Other factors 3 % 
 
As can be seen from the above figure, some 60 percent believed 
that the conflict in Maluku was not caused by religion. Some 68 
percent believed that the conflict was not a religious war. A significant 
number of respondents still considered the conflict as religious. If 
religion becomes a factor, religious misinterpretation will be 
responsible for any conflict. The character of religion as a source of 
identity will also bring about conflict, while religious teachings serve a 
minor role in creating conflict. The polling suggests that people still 
believe in the innocence of religion, while they blame political interest 
as the main source of conflict (85 percent respondents). Some 
percentage (35 percent) considers socio-economic jealousy as a factor, 
while ethnic difference has a minor place in creating conflict. Since this 
polling was done on the same month of the first riot (January 1999). 
The polling indicates that religion was not the most important factor.    
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to examine some of the perceptions and 
attitudes as expressed by radical and moderate individuals, 
organizations, media as well as the public toward the conflict in 
Maluku. This has argued that there were no single views among 
Muslims concerning the conflict. The radicals in general have 
demonstrated hostile perceptions and confrontational attitudes toward 
the enemy. They perceived the conflict as a ‘religious war’, and 
demanded MUI to issue a fatwa > that would allow Muslims outside 
Maluku to fight against the enemy in Maluku. Some organizations, 
notably Laskar Jihad, decided to go to Maluku for jiha>d based on fatwa>s 
from Saudi `Ulama >’. In their reasoning, the radicals identified the 
conflict with the Medieval Crusades (perang salib), and accused Christian 
as separatists (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS) as the master-mind of the 
first massive attack on January 19, 1999. 
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The Muslim moderates, on the other hand, avoided religious 
vocabularies, while attempting to work out peaceful solutions. The 
semi-official MUI, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Muhammadiyyah perceived 
the conflict as not religiously driven; they viewed the conflict in a more 
sophisticated way; they saw no need to wage a religious war and no 
need to issue a fatwa> for a national jiha>d.  
Although both radical and moderate strands of Islam made a link 
between the contemporary conflict and the colonial past, they saw it in 
a different way. The radicals tend to identity Christianity with 
European colonialism in such a way that justifies them to show 
hostility toward Christians, whereas the moderates were carefully 
reluctant to identify Christianity with European colonialism, 
considering the fact that colonial history and Christian history in 
Indonesia could have been different. Colonial history for the 
moderates should not be used as a justification for Christian-Muslim 
conflict.  
In their polemics, the radicals tend to associate Christianity with 
colonialism and separatism. Muslim-Christian conflict in Maluku can 
be seen as part of the history of mutual distrust in Indonesia.39 Radical 
Muslims perceived increasing Christianization in large part of 
Indonesia as also threatening the integrity of Islamic society (ummah). 
On the other hand, Christians are largely worried about what they 
perceived as Islamization and the establishment of Islamic State. 
Christians often viewed Islamic revival as similar to radicalism or 
fundamentalism. The idea of constitutionalization of the Islamic law 
has been regarded as threatening the pluralistic character of Indonesian 
nation-state.  
Another point of difference has been the perception of the 
traditional institution of pela gandong. In their writings, some radicals 
underestimated the role of pela gandong in creating tolerance in Maluku 
especially for Muslims, and regarding this tradition as un-Islamic. 
While seeing that the conflict showed the fragility of pela gandong, the 
moderates still hoped that pela gandong can be revitalized and redefined.  
Why did the radicals perceive the conflict the way they did? It can 
be argued that radicalism in Indonesia can be seen as an indication of a 
                                                 
39 See for example John L. Esposito, Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, revised edition 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 55-62; Alwi Shihab, 
"Pertemuan Islam-Kristen di Indonesia: Sebuah Tinjauan Historis," in Islam Inklusif: 
Menuju  Sikap Terbuka dalam Beragama  (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1998), pp. 3- 36.  
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“crisis of reason” and “the victory of passion”. Irrationality was 
pervasive during the conflict: rumors and misuse of religious language. 
The latter is because religion itself provides ambivalent functions. For 
the hard-liners, religious imagery is easy to be used for their commu-
nalistic purposes, especially when they see no alternative to their own 
faith. There can be found religious bigotry, prejudices, suspicion, and 
fanaticism. There is lack of moderate religious understanding as well, 
partly because of poor and exclusive religious education which 
emphasizes truth-claim absolutism, rather than tolerance. [] 
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